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The European Union and the Outer Space
Treaty: Will the Twain Ever Meet?
Frans G. von der Dunk
Introduction
In spite of the envisaged Brexit and other crises and problems currently
threatening the European Union (EU)1, that half-way house between a group
of cooperating states and a single quasi-federal union of states remains an
important player in today’s world, also – at least from a bird’s eye view – in
terms of outer space. Its member states Germany and France have the largest
space budgets of all European states (discounting the Russian Federation as
a European state), and the European flagship projects Galileo and Copernicus,
with the European Commission on behalf of the Union in the driver’s seat,
are among the most challenging and interesting space infrastructures currently
being developed.
That, obviously, then also raises the issue of the EU’s ‘relationship’ with,
views on and involvement with the Outer Space Treaty2, the most
comprehensive and generic international convention setting out the legal
framework for all space activities. It should be noted at the outset that the
Treaty itself, drafted in the middle of the Cold War and focusing on military
and scientific aspects of space activities, is very much targeting its legal regime
towards sovereign states, not towards a unique ‘phenomenon’ such as the
Union.3
Frans G. von der Dunk. 2017. The European Union and the Outer Space Treaty: Will the 
Twain Ever Meet? In Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty: Tracing the Journey (Ajey Lele, 
ed.), pp. 75–90. New Delhi: Pentagon Press. Used by permission.
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Prior to going into the specifics of any ‘relationship’ of the EU with,
views on and involvement with the Outer Space Treaty, however, it is
important to understand the proper place of the Union and its predecessor
in the broader European space endeavour – as it is by no means the only, or
even the first European body within the European ‘spacescape’.
The Broader European ‘spacescape’
Actually, the first such European bodies were the European Organisation for
the Development and Construction of Space Vehicle Launchers (ELDO)4,
established in 1962 to develop a joint European launcher after neither the UK
nor France had been able to pull off a viable launcher development programme
on their own, and the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO)5,
established the same year to coordinate and integrate (some of ) the space
research programmes of the individual member states – a group largely
overlapping, but not completely identical to that of ELDO member states.6
When both organisations turned out to fall far short of their intended
goals, in 1975 it was decided to essentially merge the two into one: thus, the
European Space Agency (ESA) was established.7 Australia left the club that
instant; ESA has since then grown to encompass 22 European-only member
states: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the UK.8
ESA soon covered almost the complete spectrum of the joint European
space effort in terms of types of activities, from pure space science to prototype
communication and earth observation satellites. The boundaries of where ESA
was deemed by the still-sovereign member states – of which especially the
larger ones also maintained their own national space programmes – to provide
the best possible venue for their space efforts were set by the ESA Convention:
The purpose of the Agency shall be to provide for and to promote, for
exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space
research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being
used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems,
(a) by elaborating and implementing a long-term European space policy,
by recommending space objectives to the Member States, and by
concerting the policies of the Member States with respect to other
national and international organizations and institutions;
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(b) by elaborating and implementing activities and programmes in the
space field;
(c) by coordinating the European space programme and national
programmes, and by integrating the latter progressively and as
completely as possible into the European space programme, in
particular as regards the development of applications satellites;
(d) by elaborating and implementing the industrial policy appropriate
to its programme and by recommending a coherent industrial policy
to the Member States.9
In other words, as soon as certain prototype technologies had proven their
feasibility, it was not deemed appropriate for ESA to continue operating them
on a ‘routine’ basis for downstream terrestrial applications. Thus, once ESA
had developed an operational launcher, in 1980 its member states created
Arianespace as a private French company with involvement and support from
about half of the current ESA member states to operate these launches on a
commercial basis.10 Once ESA had demonstrated the success and operational
viability of the satellite communications technology it had developed, in 1982
EUTELSAT was established – with ultimately more than double the amount
of member states compared to ESA (but all European) – to operate a European
satellite infrastructure for communication purposes on a quasi-commercial
basis.11 Similarly, in 1983 its member states created EUMETSAT to run with
the earth observation satellite technology ESA had developed and provide
earth observation services for meteorological, then also climate change
purposes to its member states – again, a set different (in this case slightly
larger) from the membership of ESA itself.12
As it is yet too early for Europe’s satellite navigation system Galileo
(developed, as far as the technology goes, under ESA auspices)13 or Europe’s
environmental and security monitoring system Copernicus (equally being
developed, as far as the technology goes, under ESA auspices)14 to be operated
on a daily ‘routine’, let alone commercial basis, it remains unclear for the
time being what specific respective governance systems are to be established
for the long term.
This finally brings us to the position of the EU within this larger
‘European spacescape’, as it also constitutes the main reason why the
governance systems for these two ‘European flagship projects’ will most likely
not consist of a different and formally independent entity such as Arianespace,
EUTELSAT/Eutelsat or EUMETSAT, but of an EU body or agency.15 In
many respects, this driving role for the EU represents the culmination of three
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decades of growing interest and involvement of the Union and its predecessor,
the European Community, in outer space and space activities.
The European Communities/Community/Union enters the
European ‘spacescape’
For a proper understanding of why the European Communities for a long
time did not play any role in the European ‘spacescape’ or vice versa, one has
to understand furthermore the background to and rationale of that particular
vehicle for European cooperation. From the start in the 1950s, three
intergovernmental organisations of a very special nature – the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC)16, within a few years followed by the European
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, also Euratom)17 and the European
Economic Community (EEC)18 with identical sets of member states – were
established in Europe for the purpose of regulating trade across member state
borders on the basis of an Internal Market with considerable socio-economic and
political safeguards.
Institutionally speaking, their uniqueness transpired in the way several
Community-level bodies – the predecessors of the current European
Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament and Court of Justice
of the European Communities – were able to take decisions binding upon
the totality of member states and their citizens in the respective realms
addressed by the treaties, overriding as necessary any diverging national
legislation on the subject.19
Substantively speaking, where the ECSC and EAEC by definition
confined themselves to specifically circumscribed and quite special areas of
the European economies, the EEC was supposed to address the remainder of
economic activities – to the extent addressed, explicitly or implicitly, by the EEC
Treaty or implementing European level-regulation, which meant in essence as soon
as a certain sector of the economy had become commercialised, privatised and
subject to substantial international trade and the European institutions had
officially recognised this.
This is the key: until the mid-1980s, there simply was no space sector in
Europe which fitted those conditions, hence ‘space’ figured only in some
visionary political documents, but neither in any legislative activities nor in
any material actions. Neither the growth of the three Communities in terms
of member states nor the ‘institutional integration’ thereof which took place
through various later treaties ultimately giving rise to the European
Community and the EU,20 changed this fact.
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In the mid-1980s, however, two factors changed this fundamental attitude
of abstinence.21 On the one hand, the EEC became increasingly pro-active in
stimulating the European economy (read the totality of economies of the
member states) not only by paving the way in regulatory terms for free trade
and commerce, but also by supporting research and development as far as
acting as catalysts to economic growth. The 1986 Single European Act thus
for the first time gave the EEC such a pro-active role in research and
development – which was generally agreed to including space-related research
and development.22
On the other hand, even more importantly, the mid-1980s can be seen
as heralding the commercial viability of satellite communications, the first
sector of space with clear commercial benefits, also in Europe, with the
establishment of the private satellite operator SES in Luxembourg in 1985
to start competing with the then-still-intergovernmental EUTELSAT. The
result was a first major piece of EC legislation on space, notably laying the
foundations for a single European market for the provision of satellite services,
by way of the so-called ‘Satellite Directive’ in 1994.23
On-going market developments in the area of satellite communications
led the European Commission also to force EUTELSAT to privatise;24 in
addition, in certain other areas the European authorities also started to enter
the European ‘spacescape’ with efforts to regulate certain commercial or
commercially-relevant aspects thereof. Most notable was the so-called
‘Database Directive’25 of 1996 which established a sui generis copyright for
electronic databases prominently including satellite remote sensing databases,
since existing copyright did not sufficiently cover such novel phenomena –
and protection of intellectual property rights was considered key for developing
a viable commercial remote sensing sector.
With the increasing realisation that the space sector, as a high-key
technology sector, became key to general European economic development
as well, the European Commission’s approach to ‘outer space’ and ‘space
activities’ grew progressively more comprehensive, although always limited
by the extent to which the European treaties and member states allowed.26 In
practical/political terms moreover such efforts also faced the existing realities
of a number of entrenched European entities being involved in the European
‘spacescape’, most prominently of course ESA.
The two European Flagship Projects: Galileo and Copernicus
The two European flagship projects which were initiated by the European
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Commission in the late 1990s/early 2000s not only represented the
culmination up to that point of increasing EU involvement in space activities,
it also presented a watershed. In line with the general role of the Union as a
(quasi-)legislative machinery at a partly supra-national level, until then such
involvement (along the lines sketched above) had taken place in the politico-
legal area, by way of enunciation of certain Directives and Regulations mainly
addressing market and research-and-development aspects of certain space
activities or applications.
With Galileo, however, the Union for the first time started to become an
actual ‘space player’ itself. Following initial efforts to become partners with
the US in operating Global Positioning System (GPS) as a Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS), the Commission decided it would be in the
European strategic, political and economic interest to develop a separate and
independent European satellite navigation system, which came to be called
‘Galileo’, to be built upon a satellite navigation augmentation system still
working with GPS called the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay
Service (EGNOS) developed prior to Galileo-proper.27
Through a small series of EU legislative documents28 the Commission
increasingly took control over the development and deployment phases of
the EGNOS and Galileo programmes, especially after the original intention
to have a concessionaire take over the system and operate it on a commercial
basis had fallen through. The role of ESA, originally almost on a par with
that of the Union/Commission as providing the necessary technological know-
how, correspondingly receded into the background; by now it has essentially
been relegated to the role of procuring agency on behalf of the Commission.29
In particular by owning the satellites comprising the space-part of the system,
both as launched and as yet to be launched,30 the EU may now be said to
have become a space operator at least in a formal-legal sense.
Following upon the initial positive reaction within the EU member states
to Galileo, at least on the strategic-political level, the Commission felt
emboldened to then also develop plans for an independent European satellite
infrastructure for earth observation purposes, more specifically for Global
Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES).31 Meanwhile rechristened
‘Copernicus’, following three Regulations32 the Commission had been in the
driver’s seat from the very beginning, with ESA as a kind of junior partner33
currently responsible for the few Sentinel satellites that already have been
launched.
At a later stage, although the details of the institutionalisation are far
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from clear and as of yet only a ‘GMES Bureau’ has been created within the
Commission to prepare such a future governance regime, it may be assumed
that the Union will, along roughly similar lines as with Galileo, become the
ultimate responsible authority for the space activities conducted by and with
the Copernicus infrastructure.34
In the context both of Galileo and of Copernicus, the fact that two of
the participating countries – Norway and Switzerland – are member states of
ESA only, thus co-financing the programmes to the extent that ESA is
executing them, yet not member states of the EU, so not automatically
involved in the decision-making on the future of both programmes, has so
far been solved pragmatically. Yet it has to be kept in mind – as this
membership-situation is not likely to change anytime soon – that this may
still come to present problems in the future.
The Final Step: Comprehensive EU Competence in Space?
Largely at the background of the developments mentioned earlier, a more
long-term political discussion took place on the future of European space
policy and law, and in particular the overall relationship between ESA, the
erstwhile vehicle for all such discussions and still equipped with the necessary
technical and operational know-how, and the Union/Commission, with clearly
superior powers in the political and legislative realm but, as seen, a relatively
late entrant into the European ‘spacescape’. While the Commission originally
tended to go for incorporation of ESA into the Union-structure, as a ‘space
agency of the Union’,35 already the different memberships – currently, amongst
the 28 EU member states and 22 ESA member states, 20 countries belong to
both groups – precluded that from happening in the short run.
Nevertheless, the two entities willy-nilly converged in their operations,
approaches and activities in the European ‘spacescape’.36 Still largely on the
basis of ‘equality’ the two concluded a Framework Agreement in 200337,
cementing their overall cooperation while leaving each to do what it was best
at – in accordance with its own internal procedures and modi operandi.
The major development here concerned the development of an overall
EU competence in space as opposed to the isolated areas where it had already
exercised its legislative authority on the basis of Internal Market competences.38
The end-result so far is the inclusion, following the Treaty of Lisbon39, in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU of an Article providing the following:
1. To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial
competitiveness and the implementation of its policies, the Union
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shall draw up a European space policy. To this end, it may promote
joint initiatives, support research and technological development
and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and
exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1,
the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary
measures, which may take the form of a European space programme,
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States.
3. The Union shall establish any appropriate relations with the
European Space Agency.
4. This Article shall be without prejudice to the other provisions of
this Title.40
In particular because of the italicised phrase, this ‘space competence’ has
been labelled a “parallel competence”, as it – contrary to the ‘standard’
approach of EU law – leaves the authority of individual EU member states
to enunciate domestic legislation in tact.41 Recognising the fact that currently
seven out of 28 EU member states have a comprehensive national space law
providing for a licensing regime of private space activities (in chronological
order: Sweden42, the UK43, Belgium44, the Netherlands45, France46, Austria47
and Denmark48), this quite seriously limits the actual possibility for the Union
to draft overarching EU law in this particular context.49 It thus still remains
to be seen to what extent the Union will be allowed to further develop its
legislative role in the field of European space activities and applications.
The above analyses clarify that in the end the Union’s relationship with
the Outer Space Treaty is essentially twofold, noting that of the 28 EU member
states four are not parties to the Treaty (Croatia, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia)
but that the provisions are generally recognised to present customary
international law.
The EU as a ‘legislator’ and the Outer Space Treaty
On the one hand, to the extent the Union acts in its legislative capacity,
whatever law or regulation it enacts, such law or regulation should not run
counter to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty – and at least 24 out of
28 member states are bound to ensure the Union does not do so, and are
also bound to succeed in doing so in view of their large majority. The Union
itself also recognises the fundamental obligation resting upon it to comply
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with international law, and as the Outer Space Treaty reflects customary
international law, this clearly includes that Treaty as well, even as the Union
itself has not formally indicated this specifically.50
However, the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty are rather broad and
general, providing only general obligations to:
1. Act in the interests of the international community, international
cooperation and international peace and security.51
2. Desist from the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer
space.52
3. Treat astronauts as ‘envoys of mankind’ and support them when in
distress as much as possible.53
4. Accept international responsibility and liability as appropriate, and
ensure proper authorisation and continuing supervision of non-
governmental space activities.54
5. Desist at least in principle from harmful interference with other
(States’) legitimate space activities.55
6. Allow access in principle to stations and equipment on celestial
bodies.56
7. Generally comply with international law applicable to outer space.57
While the very last obligation mentioned also raises the issue of the extent
to which other space or space-related treaties, even if not specifically mentioned
or ratified, would as extensions or elaborations of the Outer Space Treaty,
also have to be complied with, at this stage it suffices to note that so far all
EU legislation addressing space activities or issues has been fairly limited and
rather focused on specific aspects. Therefore, it can safely be said that this
overarching requirement of EU compliance with the Outer Space Treaty is
complied with so far – and until the ‘space competence’ of the Union pursuant
to the Treaty of Lisbon would really come to be exercised, that is not likely
to change.
The most pertinent example here concerns the satellite communications
realm, where, as indicated, the Union is in the process of harmonising the
market conditions within the Internal Market ever since the 1994 Satellite
Directive. Since commercial uses of outer space at least in the realm of satellite
communications, as long as compliant with the regime developed in the
framework of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) regarding
the use of orbital slots/orbits and space frequencies58, are undisputedly allowed,
the main other overarching requirement stemming from the Outer Space
Treaty concerns that of Article VI, to have such activities by private operators
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properly authorised and supervised by the appropriate state(s).59 The regime
imposed by the Union does exactly heed that requirement: only properly
licensed satellite communication operators may enjoy the benefits of that
Internal Market for telecommunication service providers, and though subject
to some EU framework conditions, such licences are to be granted by national
telecom authorities.
The EU as a ‘space operator’ and the Outer Space Treaty
On the other hand, to the extent the Union acts as a space operator – which
in the case of Galileo and, at least soon, Copernicus, would ultimately seem
to be the case – it obviously has to comply with the regime set out by the
Outer Space Treaty as well. As, again, in substantive terms, clear-cut legal
obligations are only found in a fairly limited context, the ‘institutional place’
of the Union in the framework of the Treaty is probably the most directly
relevant aspect of the relationship of the former to the latter.
In the Treaty, namely, there are but two clauses making reference to
international intergovernmental organisations. First, “[t]he provisions of this
Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty (…) including
cases where they are carried on within the framework of international
intergovernmental organizations”, and “[a]ny practical questions arising in
connection with activities carried on by international intergovernmental
organizations (…) shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either
with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States
members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty”.60
Second, “[w]hen activities are carried on in outer space (…) by an
international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall
be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to
the Treaty participating in such organization”.61 Thus, following the politico-
legal logic of the Soviet Union at the time, which did not want to accord any
special status to international organisations, ultimately such organisations
remained, legally speaking, platforms for cooperation rather than independent
legal persons capable of acting with the slightest independence from their
own member states.62
This also means, that regardless of the ‘space competence’ and the extent
to which it would allow for the Union to start encroaching upon the licensing
regimes of the seven states which so far have a national space law in place,
also from the vantage point of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty EU-level
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authorisation and continuing supervision of private space activities is neither
a requirement nor a right.
The major remaining issues would thus concern the obligations set out
in their most fundamental version in Article VII (if a state is involved in the
launching of a space object in any of the manners indicated, it will be held
liable for damage caused by such a space object) and Article VIII (if a space
object is launched into outer space, it is supposed to be registered by (one
of ) the state(s) involved, thus giving such state jurisdiction over the object).
Since, however, the Union is not a state in any relevant legal sense of the
word, as further supported by the provisions of Articles VI and XIII quoted
above, there will be EU member states carrying such liabilities and enjoying
the obligation-cum-possibility to register in its stead; how such liabilities,
obligations and exercise of jurisdictions would then further be given shape is
essentially an internal matter for the Union – so far not at all touched upon.
Will the Twain ever Meet?
The above analyses already make clear that, beyond the general obligations
of the EU and its organs to stay in line with the Outer Space Treaty’s regime,
both in its role as legislator and in its role as space operator, there will be few
direct connections between the Union and the Outer Space Treaty. Different
from follow-on space treaties developed in the bosom of the United Nations,
the Outer Space Treaty does not offer any intergovernmental organisation to
act as a de factoparty to such a treaty. Neither is there any other category of
legal subjects in the Outer Space Treaty that it could feasibly be included
under. So effectively the space activities that are and will be undertaken under
its aegis are to be accounted for by the individual EU member states also
party to the Outer Space Treaty.
Where for instance Article XXII of the Liability Convention63 and Article
VII of the Registration Convention64 do offer intergovernmental organisations
the possibility to become a de factoparty to those respective treaties, the Union
apparently does not see itself as an ‘ordinary’ intergovernmental organisation
and thus is not prepared to make use of these possibilities.
So, will the twain ever really meet? To reiterate: the only two realistic
options so far are for the Union to indeed start licensing private space operators
directly so as to become subject to the rights and obligations of Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty (which still requires an argument that, apparently the
solution found by the EU member states pursuant to Article XIII would
require such direct EU licensing, allowing it to override any stricter
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interpretation that Article VI, really, only can address states full stop), or to
accept a secondary status as an ‘intergovernmental organisation’ launching
and registering space objects pursuant to the Liability Convention (and hence
also subject to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty) respectively the
Registration Convention (and hence also subject to Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty). The first goes against the current trend in the attitudes of the
member states concerned; the second against the EU’s own political approach
– if indeed the twain will ever really meet, it will be at least a few years away.
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